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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of the estate 
of 
JOHN WILLIAM INGRAM, 
Deceased. 
APP:FJLLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 8542 
John William Ingram died on November 17, 1954, 
and left as his heirs at law, two brothers, M. S. Ingram 
and H. L. Ingram, and three sisters, Maggie I. Coulson, 
Ruth E. Marshall and Olive I. Boswell. In addition, the 
decedent left him surviving many nieces and nephews 
among whom are the four children of M. S. Ingram whose 
names are Violet Manila Brock, Bonnie Holm, Blain 
Ingram and Earl Ingram. The four nieces and nephews 
just named are the beneficiaries under the documents in 
dispute in this case and have nominated their father to be 
administrator with will annexed. All of the brothers and 
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sisters of the decedent except said M. S. Ingram oppose 
the admission of the documents to probate as wills and 
oppose the appointment of M. S. Ingram as administra-
tor with will annexed. The brothers and sisters of the 
decedent who oppose the admission of the documents to 
probate have nominated one of their own number, Maggie 
I. Coulson, to serve as administratrix in the event pro-
bate is denied the documents offered as wills. 
The trial court below appointed l\I. S. Ingram .as ad-
ministrator with will annexed, and admitted to probate 
as the last will and testament of John William Ingram a 
letter dated May 21, 1940 and addressed to Manila I. 
Brock and a writing dated November 28, 1944 which was 
enclosed in an envelope containing Thirteen Hundred 
Dollars ( $1,300.00) in government bonds. The said 
brothers and sisters of the decedent prosecute this 
appeal. For the purpose of this brief, the brother and 
sisters of the decedent, to-wit, H. L. Ingram, l\1aggie I. 
Coulson, Ruth E. Marshall and Olive I. Boswell will be 
known as the "objectors" and ~I .S. Ingram and his four 
children will be referred to as the "proponents" of the 
will. The two documents above referred to will be called 
the "will," but in so denon1inating the documents the 
appeHants do not mean in any way to admit that the 
docun1ents, or either of them, .are in fact wills. 
On May 21, 1940, John Willian1 Ingrmn, the decedent, 
wrote a letter to his niece, l\{anila I. Brock. The letter 
is ad1nitted in evidence as Exhibit 1. and the envelope 
in which it was contained is admitted as Exhibit 2. 
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That letter reads in whole as follows : 
"Nephi Ut May 21,40 
Dear Neice 
Now doubt this letter will be a grate surprise 
to you are several surprises but never the less it 
will half to come. I wish I could talk to you but 
everybody is so buissy that there is no chance of 
you coming over. Well Nila I am on the down 
hill cline and dont feel right at all this spring so 
I have decided to fix up my property and make 
it air tight and this is the only way that will stand 
so .am trusting to you to be as good to me as I am 
to you. And am deading it to you but reserve 
the right to control it till I die but iff I half to 
sell part of it to live on you would half to sign 
the deads which I hope you will be willing to do. 
And what ever is left I want you to divide eaquill 
with Earl-Bonie and Kennie and Blain and your 
self this way none of the others can do any thing 
iff I left the deads not recorded till I die then they 
could stop you from recording them .and come in 
for their share and besides Alice has come back. 
And if she is here when I go give her enough 
money to take her back ore go where she pleases. 
I am sending the deads to you then you ean send 
them back to the recorder, and have them re-
corded. Then send them back to me and I will 
put them in a safety box in at the bank in your 
.and my name with other papers and things of 
value I wish that I could talk to you. Now dont 
get worried at all nothing searies at all. but just 
dont want to take the chances any longer the 
corts would get a $1000 and then it would go to 
the Sisters and brothers and they never done me 
any good. I will close now with the same love as 
ever. Your uncle J.W.I." 
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On May 28, 1940, the decedent did the following 
things: 
1. He executed a war:ranty deed, deeding the whole 
of the 466 acres of land comprising his farm property to 
Manila Ingram Brock (Exhibit 3), but reserving a life 
estate in himself. This deed was witnessed by P. N. 
Anderson, his attorney, and was acknowledged before 
Mae B. Petty, then the Juab County Recorder, on the 
same day. This deed also included all personal property 
then owned by him which was not covered by the bill of 
sale referred to below. 
2. He executed a warranty deed, deeding his town , 
lots to Blain M. Ingram but reserving a life estate in him-
self. That deed was witnessed by P. N. Anderson and 
acknowledged on the same day by said Mae B. Petty. 
3. He executed a bill of sale of his livestock and all 
household furniture and other personal property on the 
city lots to Blain M. Ingram, Earl and Kenneth (Exhibit 
9) ·and that document was witnessed by P. N. Anderson. 
4. He endorsed in blank his two shares of water 
stock in the Nephi Irrigation Company, and had his 
signature witnessed by Mrs. Clifton Belliston in the pres-
ence of P. N. Anderson (Tr. 35-36). 
I 
5. At six o'clock p.m., he mailed the letter referred 
to above to ~Ianila I. Brock. This letter is the one which 
was admitted to probate as a will. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate the order 
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in which these acts were done; however, in view of the 
fact that the documents were prepared and witnessed 
by the attorney of the decedent and were acknowledged 
before the County Recorder, it seems fair to imply that 
the documents were executed before the letter was sent 
to Mrs. Brock, since the letter was mailed one hour .after 
the close of business in the community. 
On ~fay 29, 1940, Blain Ingram recorded his deed. 
Some time within a few days subsequent to May 28, but 
prior to June 5, Manila I. Brock received her deed from 
the decedent by mail at Greenriver, Utah, (Tr. 75) and 
mailed it to the Juab County Recorder at Nephi for 
recording. It was recorded at nine o'clock a.m., on June 
5, 1940. 
According to the uniform and uncontroverted testi-
mony of two of the proponents of the will, the two deeds 
and the bill of sale covered all the property the decedent 
then owned (Tr. 80 and 97). The date of delivery to 
Blain M. Ingram of the bill of sale is not stated with 
certainty but is believed to be about the time of the de-
livery of the warranty deed to him. However, actual 
possession of the subject of the bill of sale was not de-
livered to Blain M. Ingram until some five years later, 
after he had returned from service in the armed forces 
in World War II (Tr. 98). 
Sometime between May 28, 1940, and November 28, 
1944, the decedent acquired U.S. Government Bonds of 
the face value of Thirteen Hundred Dollars ($1,300.00). 
The testimony of Manilla I. Brock is to the effect that 
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those bonds were in her name and the decedent's name, 
although she is not certain of the exact wording by which 
r 
that was accomplished. The bonds were placed in an en-
velope by the decedent and a writing on a piece of note 
paper was also placed in the envelope (Tr. 75-6). That 
writing was admitted for probate as a part of the will 
of the decedent and reads in whole as follows : 
Dear Nnese 
"Nephi Utah 
November 28-1944 
In case ffo death Divide these after expenses 
is all paid equile. 
(s) J. W. Ingram" 
The only evidence as to where this envelope and the 
enclosed writing were kept is the evidence of one of the 
proponents and beneficiaries of the will, Manila I. Brock. 
She states that the bonds and notes were kept in the 
possession of the decedent until March, 1954, when he 
handed them to her as part of a whole group of papers 
bundled together with elastic bands. He made no par-
ticular reference to the bonds and the writing attached 
to them at the time he Handed the same to Mrs. Brock 
nor at any time subsequent thereto (Tr. 72-73). 
Evidence was adduced by the proponents showing 
that the person t·o whom the decedent referred in his 
letter of May 21, 1940, as "Neice" was Manila I. Brock 
and the persons referred to as "Earl, Bonie, Kennie and 
Blain" in that letter were here brothers and sisters. 
I )•~ 
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No evidence was adduced by the proponents showing to 
whom the decedent referred by the word "rmese" in 
the writing attached to the government bonds, nor was 
any evidence adduced designating the persons among 
whom the bonds attached to the writing of November 28, 
1944, were to be divided "equile" (equally). 
The only evidence which could by any interpreta-
tion be conceived to bear on the question of to whom the 
decedent referred by the word "N nese" (Niece) in the 
writing of November 28, 1944, and the persons among 
whom the bonds concerned in that writing were to be 
divided equally is the testimony relating to oral state-
ments of the decedent. It is the contention of the object-
ors that that evidence was evidence of to whom the de-
cedent had already distributed his property by gifts and 
deeds already executed, delivered and recorded, rather 
than statements clarifying an uncertain will. It is also 
the appellant's contention that no connection is shown 
by the evidence between the oral statements and the 
written document. The summary of the transcript of 
testimony as it regards this matter is as follows: 
1. Mr. Paul Booth, the banker, testified that the 
decedent discussed with him arrangements for placing 
his bank accounts in joint tenancy with his niece, Manila 
I. Brock, and that the decedent told him he wanted the 
funds in his bank accounts to go to said Manila I. Brock 
upon his death. 
2. Leora Belliston, a neighbor and, for .a period, 
close associate of the decedent, lived at the home of the 
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decedent until the year 1941. She stated that, around 
May, 1940, the decedent said he was going to get his 
deeds fixed in Smith's (M. S. Ingram) kids' names, and 
he had them recorded, (Tr. 37) and that he was having 
his property "fixed up for his kids, having it fixed so 
nobody else could touch it." (Tr. 38) He said, at the 
titne Mrs. Belliston purchased a piece of city property 
frmn the decedent, that he had to have permission from 
Smith Ingram to sell it to her for the reason that he had 
had the deeds to the property all recorded and that it 
was supposed to be in Blain's name (Tr. 39); that the 
relation between the decedent and the four children of 
Smith Ingram was one where they treated each other 
"nice." (Tr. 40). At the end of her direct examination, 
in sun1n1.ary, she answered the question as to statements 
made by the decedent as to what was and what was not to 
be done with his property as follows (Tr. 58): 
"Q. What discussion did you have about his prop-
erty? 
A. 'V ell, he would just say he had it fixed up so 
it would go to the Ingrain children, and no-
body else could touch it, because he had fixed 
it up. 
Q. lie said he had made the deeds' 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. That it was already in their,-
A. And that he had recorded then1. 
Q. Yes, so that he said to you he had already 
put the property in their nan1es' 
A. Yes, sir. 
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Q. In his discussions with you, Mrs. Belliston, 
did he ever reflect a concern that if his estate 
had to be probated, the court or someone else 
would get a substantial sum of money, that 
he wanted to avoid their getting it? 
A. No, he hadn't. He thought he had it fixed so 
nobody could bother it. 
Q. He conveyed to you-
A. He gave me that idea, that is what he meant. 
Q. He conveyed to you the idea that he had it 
fixed so it wouldn't h.ave to go to court. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. So it would not have to be probated. 
A. Yes." 
3. Mrs. Louise Ingram, the wife of M. S. (Smith) 
Ingram and the mother of the four persons who are 
the proponents of the will, testified that during 1940 and 
immediately prior thereto the association between her 
children and the decedent was friendly (Tr. 64) and that 
they administered to the decedent's wants during the 
year 1940 and prior thereto; that during the period 
just after the spring of 1940 the decedent told her that 
he hadn't been feeling well, had fixed up his properties, 
had made his deeds out and fixed his will (Tr. 65); that, 
in that connection, he had written to her daughter, Ma:r:!-ila 
I. Brock and explained everything to her and what she 
should do and that he had everything fixed up by a 
lawyer (Tr. 65-66); that, at this same time in 1940, he 
said he had everything fixed and that he had left it to 
her children (Tr. 66) ; that he used to say quite a few 
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times that he had his property all fixed up so that no one 
else could get it, because he wanted it to go to her chil-
dren ( Tr. 67). In summary of her testimony and the 
cross examination she testified as follows (Tr. 67-69): 
"CROSS EXAMINATION by Mr. Tanner: 
Q. Mrs. Ingram, at the time of whichyou speak 
where Will Ingram said he had things fixed 
up so your children would get that property, 
at that time he had already given the property 
by deeds to your children, hadn't he~ 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. His statement to you was that he had already 
given them the property, wasn't itT 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Not that he was going to, but that he had? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Your answer was yes, was it not T 
A. Yes. 
Q. He was concerned, was he not, with getting 
his property fixed up at this time, about 1940, 
in such a manner that it wouldn't have to go 
to court, wasn't he T 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And he reflected to you in his conversations 
that he had fixed it up so it would not have 
to be dealt with by a court, did he not Y 
A. He didn't say court. He said there wouldn't 
be any trouble. 
Q. Did he ever reflect to you any concern 
whether or not his property would have to be 
probated 1 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Never said anything about that one way or 
the other' 
A. No, sir. 
Q. He told you he had written to Manilla 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did he say that that writing was the one in 
which he gave her the deeds to the property 1 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Didn't say anything about whether or not it 
was that letter. 
A. He said he had written and informed her. 
Q. As a matter of fact, Will Ingram wrote to 
Manilla, oh, every month, or perhaps more 
often than that. 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, can you give us an estimate 1 
A. No. Because she was in Green River, and 
I was here. 
Q. Didn't they write quite often 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Kept in pretty close touch, did they not 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. There would have been a lot of letters to 
:Manilla, would there not 1 
A. Well, yes, I imagine." 
4. Manila I. Brock, the principal proponent of the 
will, said in relation to the writing attached to the bonds, 
that her uncle gave her a whole lot of papers in the hospi-
.. : 'i ~ 
'lf'1'1 
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tal in ~larch of 1954 mnong which was the envelope 
and the writing concerning the bonds (Tr. 88) and that 
he said to her "I have some p.apers here for Blain and 
yourself, take care of them." On cross examination her 
testimony in relation to the bonds and the writing in the 
envelope with them was as follows (Tr. 77-78): 
"Q. When you got those bonds in the first in-
stance, they were not referred to by your 
Uncle Will individually in any way, were 
they f By that, I mean he just handed you 
a lot of papers, among which was this enve-
lope including the bonds. 
A. The bonds was among the papers. 
Q. Yes, there were a number of papers. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And among the papers was an envelope which 
you received that was unopened f 
A. Yes. 
Q. And your uncle didn't make any special refer-
ence to that envelope, did he, when he handed 
the paper over to you f 
A. Not that one in particular. 
Q. He just gave you the group of p.apers? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then subsequent to that ti1ne you opened the 
envelope and saw the bonds and this paper, 
is that right Y 
A. After that, yes. 
Q. And when did you open that! \Vas it -
A. \Vell-
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Q. - before or after his death~ 
A. Before, when I had the papers in my posses-
sion I glanced through them. 
Q. And when you glanced through them was the 
first time you saw them~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. After your uncle handed you these bonds, 
which were included among the other papers, 
did he ever make any individual or separate 
reference to you other than what he had writ-
ten in the envelope' 
A. vV ell, not pertaining to the bonds, no, he 
didn't make any particular mention." 
5. Bonnie Hohn, one of the proponents states that 
she came into the w.ard where the decedent was at the 
time he was handing :Manila some papers and heard hin1 
say to her "Now these are for you and Blain. Take care 
of them." 
The only mention in the entire transcript of the word 
"will" was a statement of :Mrs. Louise Ingram to the 
effect that, shortly after the spring of 1940, Will Ingram 
said to her that he had made a will. There is no evidence 
or testimony whatever in the entire proceeding relating 
that statement to any document. Particularly, there is 
no evidence relating that statement to either of the docu-
ments ad1nitted to probate herein as wills. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE PROPONENTS HAVE 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT A LETTER, NOT 
PURPORTING ON ITS FACE TO BE A WILL, WAS NOT 
EXECUTED ANIMO TESTANDI. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR THE REASONS THAT THE EVIDENCE AD-
DUCED BY THE PROPONENTS CLEARLY AND UNEQUI-
VOCABLY SHOWS THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE 
A WILL, BUT WAS, INSTEAD, A LETTER ADVISING ITS 
RECIPIENT OF A GIFT IN PRAESENTI BEING MADE TO 
HER BY THE DECEDENT AND AN OUTLINE OF DECED-
ENT'S PLAN FOR MAKING INTER VIVOS GIFTS OF HIS 
PROPERTY IN ORDER TO A VOID PROBATE. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL ·COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE ONLY PROVISION 
IN SAID LETTER WHICH COULD, BY ANY INTERPRETA-
TION, BE CONSTRUED TO BE OF A TESTAMENTARY 
NATURE IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN INSTRUCTION 
TO THE DONEE OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFT AS TO THE 
USE TO WHICH THE SUBJECT OF THE GIFT IS TO BE 
PUT AT THE TERMINATION OF THE DONOR'S LIFE 
ESTATE THEREIN. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DECED-
ENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1944, TO PROBATE AS 
A WILL FOR THE REASON 'THAT IT IS SO AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE WHOLLY INCAPABLE OF 
BEING ADMINISTERED AS A WILL. 
POINT V 
IN THE EVENT THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED TO 
PROBATE HEREIN AS THE WILL OF THE DECEDENT 
ARE HELD NOT TO BE WILLS, THE APPOINTMENT OF 
M. S. INGRAM AS EXECUTOR HEREIN SHOULD BE VA-
CATED FOR THE REASON THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE 
ADVERSE TO AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS 
OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF THE DECEDENT. 
STATEl\iENT OF THE CASE 
John William Ingram, the decedent, owned, either 
at the time of his death or immediately prior thereto, 
a substantial amount of property including in the neigh-
borhood of $20,000.00 in bank accounts and mortgages 
receivables and $1,300.00 in government bonds. All of 
this property has been taken into the possession of 
Manila I. Brock on the theory that she was a valid 
joint tenant with the decedent in the hank accounts, 
government bonds and receivables and became the owner 
of the property upon the decedent's death. As to the 
government bonds, and some minor assets stated to be in 
the estate of the decedent, as reflected by the petition 
of M. S. Ingram for letters of administration with will 
annexed, there is a conflict between the two groups in-
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volved in this litigation, i.e., on one side, M. S. Ingram 
and his four children, the proponents of the so-called 
will, and on the other side, brothers and sisters of the de-
cedent, called the objectors as mentioned earlier in this 
brief. However, the real controversy relates to the bank 
accounts and the receivables which have not been listed 
by said M. S. Ingram as being assets of the estate. The 
struggle reflected in this n1atter to date centers around 
the appointn1ent of ~I. S. Ingran1 as administrator and 
the admission of the documents as the will of the deced-
ent. The appointment of the administrator is deemed of 
key importance by both groups for the reason that the 
administrator can select his attorney and can govern 
whether or not a serious attempt will be made to secure 
the return of the cash and receivables to the estate .as 
assets, or not. The objectors believe that, if a genuine 
effort is made, those assets can be shown to properly 
be the property of the estate, but that, if a half-hearted 
effort, or no effort at all, is 1nade, an opposite result 
1nay be anticipated. In addition it is deemed important 
by the objectors that so1neone other than ~I. S. Ingram 
be appointed in order that the estate itself n1ay carry the 
financial burden of the litigation concerning the bank 
accounts and the receivables rather than the objectors 
having to carry th.at financial burden themselves and 
having to force the affininistrator to seek those assets. 
It is apparent then, that the issues of law involved in 
this brief concern substantially larger assets than are 
reflected in the petition over whirh this conflict now cen-
ters. 
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The essence of the argument of the objectors is that 
the letter written by the decedent to 1\ianila I. Brock 
is not a testamentary document at all, but is simply a 
letter explaining to her the steps taken by the decedent, 
under the advice of his attorney, P. N. Anderson, to then 
dispose of all of his property in order to avoid probate. 
The objectors believe this is proved both by the wording 
of the letter itself and by the evidence introduced both 
by the proponents and by the objectors in connection 
with that letter. That evidence shows conclusively that 
:M. S. Ingram n1ade deeds or bills of sale, in praesenti, 
passing title to all the property he owned in 1\iay 1940. 
The only effect his death was expected to have upon 
his property would be that it would terminate his life 
estate in the real property. If a present disposition of 
his property was what the decedent intended and acconl-
plished in 1940, the requisite animo testandi is missing 
and the letter cannot be admitted to probate as a will. 
The objectors claim that the document attached to 
the bonds, and reading "Dear Nnese, In case ffo death 
Divide these after Expenses is all paid equile" is so 
lacking in necessary certainty that, by itself, it could not 
be expected to stand as a testamentary document. How-
ever, the proponents claim that, if it is viewed as a codi-
cil to the letter of 1940, it then takes on the requisite cer-
tainty. The objectors claim that there is no evidence in 
the record whatever either giving that document suffi-
cient certainty to be admitted as a will or connecting 
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the document In any :m,anner whatever with the letter 
of 1940. 
After hearing and argument below, the trial court, 
the Honorable Will L. Hoyt presiding, admitted both 
letters to probate as a single will .and this appeal is taken 
by the o bj~ctors. The question as to whether the assets 
of the estate of the decedent which are not covered by 
either of the documents admitted to probate below should 
pass to the objectors as the heirs at law of the decedent, 
being a question of the interpretation of a will rather 
than its admissibility, has been reserved until such time 
as there is a determination by this court as to whether 
or not the controverted documents are in fact wills. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
'THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR 'THE REASON THAT THE PROPONENTS HAVE 
FAILED TO SUSTAIN THEIR BURDEN OF PROOF AND 
OVERCOME THE PRESUMPTION THAT A LETTER, NOT 
PURPORTING ON ITS FACE TO BE A WILL, WAS NOT 
EXECUTED ANIMO TESTANDI. 
The essential issue in this appeal is whether the evi-
dence adduced herein shows that the two letters admitted 
to probate as a will were in fact wills, or were in fact 
jointly a single will, or were in fact not wills at all, either 
separately or jointly. In determining that 1natter, the 
court is guided by certain presu1nptions, the first of 
which presumptions is that an informal instrument, such 
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as .a letter, not purporting on its face to be a will, was not 
executed animo testandi and therefore is not a will. This 
presumption is pointed up in two comprehensive A.L.R. 
annotations covering most of the problems presented in 
this appeal. r:rhe annotations discuss the admissibility 
of a letter as a will or codicil. The first of these anno-
tations is at 54 A.L.R. 917 and the second, bringing the 
propositions in the first .article up to a very recent date, 
is at 40 A.L.R. 2d 698. These annotations have direct 
application to the letter of May 21, 1940, upon which 
the devolution of all of decedent's property save and 
except the $1,300.00 worth of government bonds, must 
depend. 
At Page 932 of 54 A.L.R., the subject of presump-
tion is discussed as follows : 
"It is generally conceded that in addition to 
the usual burden of proof resting upon the pro-
ponent of a will in probate proceedings, it is also 
presumed that an informal instrument, such as a 
letter, not purporting on its face to be a will, was 
not executed animo testandi. 1 Redfield, Wills, 
F,ourth Edition, 167." 
(This is cited as being the rule in Texas, 
England, Californ1a and Montana, and no juris-
dictions are cited as dissenting from this rule.) 
"Although it has been erroneously referred to 
as applicable in some of the cases, the presump-
tion against intestacy, being a rule for the con-
struction of wills, should not be applied to the 
issue of testamentary character, which arises only 
in the probate of the will, and not in its construc-
tion. In re Anthony (1913), 21 Cal. App. 157, 
131 P. 96." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
This p_resumption is discussed in the article in 40 
A.L.R. 2d at Page 728, citing cases approving the rule 
set forth in the earlier annotation. 
It is clear then that the proponents of the letter of 
:May 21, 1940, have not only the usual burden of proving 
that said letter was executed with testamentary intent, 
but, in ·addition, must overcome the presumption that it 
was not executed with testamentary intent. 
In connection with this point and the points raised 
1n the balance of. this brief it may be well to consider 
as background the comprehensive discussion in Page 
on Wills, Lifetime Edition, setting forth the tests by 
which one can ascertain whether a given document is a 
will, or s01ne other kind of instrument, such as, in the 
instant case, a mere letter of explanation. In this regard 
it should be pointed out that the appellants do not urge 
that the controversial letter lacks the formal require-
ments for an olograph. The point of the appellants is 
that, although the letter would suffice as an olograph, 
being entirely written, dated and signed in the hand of 
the decedent, it lacks the inherent, intrinsic and essential 
elen1ents of a will. The following extracts from Page on 
\V1ll:-:;, supra, set forth that author's .authoritative views 
on the subject at hand: 
"Sec. 44. Elements of tllc will. 
"In Anglo-An1erican law the will is a distinct 
legal concept; as distinct as the deed or the 
contract. Its characteristic elmnents distinguish 
it, and 1nark it off, fron1 other leg.al concepts. 
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"In part, for convenience of discussion, and in 
part, because they are frequently confused, in 
spite of their essential difference, the elements 
of a will must be grouped under two general 
classes. One of these consists of the essential, 
intrinsic, or inherent elements; and the other of 
the extrinsic, or formal elements. Although this 
distinction, as a rule, is not made by the courts 
in so many words, it is constantly recognized by 
the courts; and serves as the basis of their treat-
ment of the entire subject. 
"The formal or extrinsic elements of a will 
are the elements which may be modified without 
changing the essential nature of the will. These 
elements deal with the form in which the will must 
be executed in order to be operative; such as the 
signature by testator and .attestation and sub-
scription by witnesses. While these elements are 
of the greatest practical importance, as a will 
which is executed without complying with the 
necessary requirements is of no effect, the law 
may be altered, so as to require signature by 
testator, or signature at a given place; or so as 
to dispense with signature altogether; or so as 
to require attestation and subscription by any 
number of witnesses, or so as to dispense with 
it altogether, without changing the essential na-
ture of the will or its place in the law. For this 
reason, these elements are spoken of as extrinsic 
or formal. In almost every state, they are now 
regulated and controled by statute. They are 
discussed in detail elsewhere. 
"The inherent, intrinsic, or essential elements 
of a will are those which can not be altered with-
out changing the nature of the will itself, and 
affecting its position in our law. The essential 
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idea of a will is that it takes effect only upon 
the death of the testator, and that it p.asses no 
interest in property until his death; although 
it may create property rights which do not vest 
until after testator's death. 
* * * 
"In order to have an operative instrument, 
the formalities or extrinsic elements must be 
those which the law requires for an instrument 
of the type which the instrument in question is 
finally determined to be, after a study of its 
essential or inherent elements." 
"Sec. 45. The Origin and Classes of Inherent 
Elements. 
"The inherent elements of a will at Anglo-
American law do not depend on legislation. They 
depend on principles of law which do not depend 
upon legislation. Some of these principles can 
be traced back through the law of Germanic 
England before the Norman Conquest, and others 
were worked out by the English ecclesiastical 
law, or by equity. 
"Whatever their ultimate source, they had 
been developed by the English and American 
courts into .a distinctive body of law. 
''It is frequently said that these inherent ele-
Inents consist of (1) the intention to make a will; 
and (2) revocability. As will be seen later, the 
latter of these ele1nents follows from the former. 
It is rather a consequence of the first, than a 
separate class." 
Section 46. Intentiou to Make Will - Use 
of tlie Word 'TVill.' 
"The courts have Baid again and again that 
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the test whether or not an instru1nent is testa-
mentary in character is whether it was executed 
with animus testandi; with testamentary intent. 
While this is standard form of orthodox state-
ment, it is, in itself, of little help, since it does 
not explain what the animus testandi is. 
"Animus testandi does not necessarily mean 
that the word 'will' or 'testament' must be used 
in the transaction. A man may make his will 
animo t~standi, though he is so ignorant of law 
that he thinks it is called a deed or contract; or 
though he does not know what to call it. The test 
is not what he thinks is the legal name of the 
instrument which he is executing, but what its 
leg.al effect is in view of its nature, and of the 
real intention of the maker as deduced from the 
instrument and from all facts and circumstances. 
The fact that the testamentary provisions form 
a very small part of the entire document, the 
bulk of which is not intended to oper.ate as a 
will, does not make such small part of the in-
strument inoperative as a will. 
* * * 
"The animus testandi, then, does not turn 
on the presence or absence of the words 'will' or 
'testament', but on the intention of the testator 
as shown by the nature of the instrument and 
the surrounding facts .and circumstances." 
"Sec. 57. Intention to Make Testamentary 
Gift by Instrument in Question. 
"In order that an instrument may amount 
to a will, it must show testator's intention to 
make a testamentary gift by that instrument, as 
distinguished from a gift to be made, or spoken of 
as already made, by some other instrument. (Cit-
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ing among other cases, In re Jensen's Estate, 37 
Utah 428, 108 Pac. 927.) 
* * * 
"If testator's intention appears to be to make 
a gift by the instrutnent in question, to take effect 
on his death, the instrument is a will, although 
no formal words of devise or bequest may appear, 
and the instrument itself is chiefly a recital of 
facts or says that testator 'wants to make a deed'. 
"Section 60. Intention That Instrument Shall 
Take Effect Only At Death of Testator. 
"If an instrument is executed animo testandi, 
the person who executes it intends such instrument 
to take effect only at his death. This is inevitable 
if the instrument merely appoints an executor, 
or a guardian for testator's minor children to 
act on testator's death." In each of these cases 
testator must intend that his own death shall 
take place before such appointment shall take 
effect. If the instrument disposes of property, 
it is just as possible for the donor to intend to 
give such property during his lifetime as after 
his death. The in1port.ant distinction between the 
will and the other instru1nents with which it may 
be confused is that the will does not take effect 
until the death of the testator, and no interest 
of any kind passes under it until the death of 
the testator; while under n1ost of the instrun1ents, 
which 1nust be distinguished frmn the will, some 
interest is intended to pass, and the instru1nent 
is intended to take effect, during the lifetime 
of thr parties thereto .... " 
1\r otes to Section 60. 
"A rule recognized by this court, which seems 
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to have the united support of the authorities, 
furnishes .an unerring test to determine the char-
acter of the instrument. It is this: If the in-
strument passes a present interest, althottgh the 
right to its possession and enjoyment may not 
occur until some future time, it is a deed or con-
tract; but if the instrument does not pass an 
interest or right until the death of the maker, 
it is a will or testamentary paper." Owen vs. 
Smith 91 Ga. 564, 18 S.E. 527. 
"The essence of a testamentary disposition 
of property is that it be merely a declaration of 
the testator's intention as to what shall take 
place after his death." Eaton vs. Blood, 201 Ia. 
834, 44 A. L. R. 1516, 208 N.W. 508. 
"A will is an instrument by which a person 
makes disposition of his property to take effect 
after his death." Austin vs. First Trust and 
Savings Bank, 343 Ill. 406, 175 N.E. 554. 
Section 71. Revocability. 
"Revocability is .an- essential element of a 
will. It follows from the idea that the will passes 
no present interest in the property devised or 
bequeathed. Such property still belongs to the 
original owner. He has parted with no interest 
in it by making the will. He can still sell the 
property or exchange it, or pledge it or give it 
away. He may revoke the will already made and 
make a new will, or die intestate, as he pleases. 
So closely is revocation tied up with the fact that 
a will passes no interest during the life of the 
testator, that it seems as though one of these 
statements were only a repitition of the other in 
different words. ·It is possible that a systern of 
law might be imagined in which a will was ir-
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revocable and yet passed no interest during the 
lifetime of testator; but this is not the way we 
think or talk about the legal institution of the 
will. 
"If the instrument executed is such that the 
maker can not revoke it, it may be a deed, a con-
tract, and the like, but it can not be a will. And 
on the other hand, if the instrument is a will, 
it is revocable." (Italics added.) 
With the above discussion in mind, let us proceed 
to other points of this brief. -l 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR ·THE REASONS THAT THE EVIDENCE AD-
DUCED BY THE PROPONENTS CLEARLY AND UNEQUI-
VOCABLY SHOWS THAT IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO BE 
A WILL, BUT WAS, INSTEAD, A LETTER ADVISING ITS 
RECIPIENT OF A GIFT IN PRAESENTI BEING MADE TO 
HER BY THE DECEDENT AND AN OUTLINE OF DECED-
ENT'S PLAN FOR MAKING INTER VIVOS GIFTS OF HIS 
PROPERTY IN ORDER TO AVOID PROBATE. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE DE-
CEDENT'S LETTER OF MAY 21, 1940, TO PROBATE AS A 
WILL FOR THE REASON THAT THE ONLY PROVISION 
IN SAID LETTER WHICH COULD, BY ANY INTERPRETA-
TION, BE CONSTRUED TO BE OF A TESTAMENTARY 
NATURE IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN INSTRUCTION 
TO THE DONEE OF AN INTER VIVOS GIFT AS TO THE 
USE TO WHICH THE SUBJECT OF THE GIFT IS TO BE 
PUT AT THE TERMINATION OF THE DONOR'S LIFE 
EST ATE THEREIN. 
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These two points will be discussed together. 
On May 28, 1940, the decedent disposed of all the 
property, real and personal, then owned by him, and he 
made that disposition, irrevocably, by present warranty 
deeds delivered and recorded and by bills of s.ale. After 
those transfers were made, he mailed to his niece, Manila 
I. Brock, the letter dated !iay 21~ 1940, but mailed at 
six o'clock p. m., May 28, 1940. The effect of that letter 
and its essential nature must be considered in connection 
with the facts surrounding its execution and delivery. 
The fact th.at the letter was written, though not mailed, 
prior to the actual execution of the documents executed 
May 28, 1940, shows only that it is one of a sequence 
of events intended to carry out the wish of the decedent 
as it existed in May 1940. When the decedent got every-
thing taken care of, he mailed the letter of instruction 
and information to his niece and, in a separate cover, 
mailed the deeds referred to in it. The testimony is 
uniform .and unequivocal that the warranty deed to 
Manila I. Brock is the deed referred to in that letter. 
Did the decedent intend to accomplish anything 
by the letter itself~ If he did not intend to govern the 
passage of his property after his death by this letter 
itself, it is not a will. As stated in Page on Wills, supra,: 
"In order that an instrument may amount to a will, it 
must show testator's intention to m.ake a testamentary 
gift by that instrument as distinguished from a gift 
to be made or spoken of as already made by some other 
instrument." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
The decedent intended to accomplish the following 
things by the letter itself: 
1. To advise his niece that he had deeded to her 
his farm and the personal property covered in the deed. 
2. To advise his niece that he reserved the right to 
control the property until he died and that he had ac-
complished that control by reserving a life tenancy. 
3. To advise his niece that, in connection with the 
gift presently being made, he expected her to be good 
enough to him to deed back any portion of the property 
which he might have to sell to live on. This, however, 
was precatory and was recognized to be, and understod 
to be a reservation not enforceable at law. 
4. To advise his niece that whatever portion of the 
property he did not request to be deeded back to him 
in order to pay his living expenses, was not hers to 
hold for herself alone but was hers to divide equally 
with her two brothers and sister. 
5. To advise his niece that it was necessary for 
the deeds to be recorded so that there then be a present 
completed gift of his property in order to avoid the 
probate of his property. 
6. To advise his niece that he was concerned with 
the status of his property because his ex-wife, ... Uice, 
had come back to Utah and to tell his niece that if Alice 
is in Utah at the tune of the death of the decedent, his 
niece is to give her enough money to take her back to 
wherever she pleases. 
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The only portion of this document which c.an, by 
any stretch of the imagination, be interpreted to be of 
a testamentary nature rather than of a discussion of a 
gift praesenti, is the following: 
"And whatever is left I want you to divide eaquill 
with Earl-Bonnie and Kennie and Blain .and yourself" 
That sentence cannot be lifted out of the context 
of the letter without completely altering its clear intent. 
When viewed in light of the contemporaneous events 
and the rest of the letter, that sentence clearly means 
that Manila I. Brock is to divide equally with her two 
brothers and sister all portions of the property then 
being deeded to her which have not been deeded back 
prior to the death of the decedent to furnish him with 
money upon which to live. To give it any other con-
struction is to do violence to the clear meaning of the 
whole of the letter and is to do violence to the plan of 
the decedent then being carried out, that is, a series of 
gifts in praesenti passing all of his property to the 
objects of his benevolence, but reserving a life estate 
to himself. The pertinent portions of the letter in this 
regard .are as follows : 
"Well Nila I am on the down hill cline and 
dont feal right at all this spring so I have decided 
to fix up my property and make it air tight and 
this is the only way that will stand so am trusting 
to you to be as good to me as I .am to you. And 
am deading it to you but reserve the right to 
control it till I die but if I half to sell part of it 
to live on you would half to sign the dead which 
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I hope you will be willing to do. And what ever 
is left I want you to divide eaquill with Earl-Bonie 
and Kennie and Blain and your self • • • I am 
sending the deads to you then you can send them 
back to me and I will put them in ·a safety Box 
in at the bank in your and my name with other 
property and things of value I wish that I could 
talk to you." 
In addition to the clear meaning of these words as 
relating solely to the residuum of the property being 
deeded to Manila Brock with life tenancy reserved, 
there is the rule of law set forth in Point I to the effect 
that the presumption is against the consideration of this 
letter as a will. 
As is apparent from the evidence as summarized 
in the statement of facts herein, the only testimony 
adduced by the proponents of this letter as a will was 
evidence that the decedent orally stated a number of 
times that he had already fixed up his property so that 
it would not have to go to court. The issue in this case 
is whether he fixed up his property in that manner by 
making present gifts of it or by making .a will to control 
the devolution of his property upon his death. It is clear 
from the evidence that he was referring to present gifts 
already executed and completed and did not intend that 
the letter should pass any interest upon his death. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING DECED-
ENT'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 28, 1944, TO PROBATE AS 
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A WILL FOR THE REASON THAT IT IS SO AMBIGUOUS 
AND UNCERTAIN AS TO BE WHOLLY INCAPABLE OF 
BEING ADMINISTERED AS A WILL. 
Ordinarily the question of the construction of a 
will would not concern the court at the time the document 
is proposed for probate. The rules for the construction 
of wills are detailed by statute in this state and gener-
ally have no application until such time as the will has 
been admitted to probate and the problem of what prop-
erty has been bequeathed to whom arises. However, a 
document can be so uncertain and ambiguous as to be 
incapable of administration as a will. In that event, 
the rule is that it ought not to be admitted to probate 
at all. That rule is set forth in Page on Wills, Lifetime 
Edition, Sec. 54, as follows : 
usee. 54. Expression of Intention in Definite 
Terms. 
The intention of testator to make a testa-
mentary disposition of his property, or to appoint 
an executor or a testamentary guardian, must 
be expressed in such terms as the court can 
determine what was his wish without resort to 
conjecture. Both the thing given and the person 
to whom it is given must, in testamentary dis-
positions of property, be set forth with such 
certainty that the court can give effect to such 
gift when the estate is to be distributed." 
The whole of the pencil-written note, wholly written, 
dated and signed by the decedent and enclosed in an 
envelope together with $1,300.00 worth of government 
bonds is as follows : 
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"Dear Nnese 
In case ffo death 
Divide these after expenses is all paid 
equile. 
/s/ J. W. Ingram" 
It is apparent that there is nothing in this note to 
connect it in any way with the letter written more than 
four years previous at the time the decedent deeded 
away all the property he then had. Apparently the de-
cedent acquired some bonds in the intervening period 
and intended to dispose of them after his death by the 
note he enclosed with them. The very existence of that 
note is strong argument against the interpretation of 
the letter of ~lay 21, 1940 as a will. Had that letter been 
intended to be a will, and had the decedent intended 
that all of his property go to his nieces and nephews 
under that letter of May 21, there would have been no 
need for any supplemental writing. 
One cannot tell fr01n the face of this document to 
whom it is addressed, other than that it is addressed to 
one of the many nieces of the decedent. One cannot tell 
from the face of this docun1ent an1ong whom the resid-
uary of the proceeds of those bonds, after expenses in 
ea~e of death, are to be divided equally. If these defi-
ciencies are elearl~· supplied by the parol evidence ad-
duced by the proponents of this document as a will, the 
document should be admitted to probate, but it should 
be the whole of the will and the sole will of the decedent 1 
and should pertain only to the bonds to which it was 
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attached and to which it refers. This would leave the 
balance of the estate of the decedent to pass to the ob-
jectors by virtue of their position as heirs of the de-
cedent. 
Wbat, then, does the parol evidence adduced by the 
proponents establish~ All P.aul Booth's testimony was 
to the effect that the decedent wanted his bank accounts 
placed in joint tenancy with his niece, Manila I. Brock. 
Leora Belliston testified that, in 1940, the decedent 
believed he had already fixed his property so that it 
then had p.assed to his nieces and nephews. Louise 
Ingram's testimony likewise was confined to the period 
of about May 1940 and likewise was to the effect that 
the decedent believed he had already passed his property 
to his nieces and nephews and the property would not 
have to go to court. Now here in any of the or.al testimony 
of the proponents is there any evidence that, in the 
writing of November 28, 1944, it was intended by the 
decedent that the persons among whom the bonds were 
to be divided were the two nieces and the two nephews. 
There is testimony that, in March 1954, the decedent 
handed a large number of papers, including all his per-
sonal papers, to Manila I. Brock and said "I have some 
papers here for Blain and yourself, take care of them." 
To give this document effect as a will, this court 
would have to hold that the delivery of it to Manila I. 
Brock among other papers completely without any spe-
cific reference to it, either before or after the handing 
of this large number of papers to Manila, is sufficient 
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evidence that she is the "nnese" to which the writing 
referred. Further the court would have to find from 
the words "I have some papers here for Blain and your-
self, take care of them" that sufficient certainty was 
given to the words "divide these equile" to enable this 
document to be pro bated. In the field of wills, such 
uncertain and unsubstantiated conclusions ought not to 
be reached on the basis of such evidence. There are 
sound reasons of public policy for the avoidance of fraud 
which ought to be given consideration in this regard. 
POINT V 
IN THE EVENT THE DOCUMENTS ADMITTED TO 
PROBATE HEREIN AS THE WILL OF THE DECEDENT 
ARE HELD NOT TO BE WILLS, THE APPOINTMENT OF 
M. S. INGRAM AS EXECUTOR HEREIN SHOULD BE VA-
CATED FOR THE REASON THAT HIS INTERESTS ARE 
ADVERSE TO AND IN CONFLICT WITH THE INTERESTS 
OF THE HEIRS AT LAW OF THE DECEDENT. 
If this court finds that the letter of May 21, 1940, 
was in fact .a will and is entitled to probate and finds 
that the letter of November :28, 1944, was a part of that 
will and is entitled to probate as a part of said will, 
M. S. Ingram ought properly to be the administrator 
of this estate for the reason that his function will be to 
preside over the passing of the property of this estate, 
or at least that portion of said property which is cov-
ered by the wills to his sons and daughters. This is a 
function which a father can carr~~ out in good conscience 
and without sueh abnonnal strain as would render him 
compet0nt or unwise or subjeet to undue influence. 
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However, in the event this court finds that the letter of 
May 21, 1940, wa.s not a will, whether or not this court 
finds that the note of November 28, 1944, is admissable 
to probate, M. S. Ingram ought not to be appointed 
administrator. For to give him that .appointment would 
be to place upon him the burden of getting back from 
his own sons and daughters the proceeds of the bonds 
and the $20,000.00 in bank accounts and other receivables 
which they have already distributed to themselves. 
The heirs at l.aw of the decedent, save and except 
M. S. Ingram himself, alii oppose and object to his ad-
ministration of the estate. This objection should be 
given no countenance if the heirs at law have no interest 
in the estate or if they have an interest only in a minority 
portion of the estate; however, if the bulk of the estate 
of the decedent is to pass to the heirs at law, their almost 
unanimous wishes ought to be respected. Not only would 
this be equitable and just but, in the instant case, it 
would be simple humanity. 1\L S. Ingram ought not, 
in that event, to be placed in the position of having to 
pursue his sons and daughters for the return of sub-
' stantial amounts of property for the benefit of their 
antagonists. He could not be expected to do this job 
fairly or without substantial conflict with the other 
heirs at law who have evidenced that they can have no 
faith in his fairness or his justice. 
The cross examination of Mrs. Coulson, who has 
petitioned to be, ·and has been designated by her brother 
and sisters to be, the administratix, throws some doubt 
'!! i i 
I' 
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upon her capacity to act as administrator. In the event 
this court feels that she cannot, in conjunction with 
competent counsel of her choice, properly handle the 
affairs of this estate, the solution is not the appointment 
of the controversial M. S. Ingram as administrator but 
is an instruction that some other capable person be 
nominated by the objectors and be properly appointed 
with bond to carry out his lawful duty. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, that is, that the 
letter of May 21, 1940, is not a testamentary document 
and that the note of November 28, 1944, is not suffi-
ciently certain to be probated, the appellants respect-
fully request this court to reverse the order of the trial 
court admitting said documents to probate and appoint-
ing M. S. Ingram as administrator with will attached. 
Further, the appellants request that the order of the 
trial cour~ dismissing the petition of the appellant Maggie 
I. Coulson for appointment as administratrix be re-
versed. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
EARL D. TANNER 
Attorney for Appellants 
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